By Joen Martinsen
Europe’s security landscape has undergone profound changes in the early months of 2025. Provocative remarks from the new U.S. administration—such as Trump’s assertion that Ukraine should never have started the war—and high-profile events like President Zelensky’s visit to the Oval Office and JD Vance’s stirring speech at the Munich Conference have intensified these shifts. At the same time, U.S. officials have amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly threatened to withdraw critical military and nuclear resources from Europe. Rather than simply expressing indifference to European concerns, the current U.S. leadership appears intent on reshaping the continent—sowing internal divisions, influencing elections, and igniting culture wars—in pursuit of individual bilateral deals rather than a united European alliance. This approach, eerily reminiscent of Russian tactics, is sending shock waves through the post–World War II European security order and has sparked calls for a new era of European defense.
With the U.S. President repeatedly questioning America’s commitment to NATO’s security guarantees, European leaders are now forced to ask: Can Europe continue to rely on American protection in an era of shifting alliances? The challenge is not limited to traditional military threats; modern warfare presents a complex array of dangers—from cyberattacks and the sabotage of critical infrastructures like internet submarine cables to the disruption of navigation and communication systems such as GPS. Public support for increased military spending and deeper European defense cooperation is high today, but as the sense of immediate crisis fades, so too might that support.
Therefore, European leaders must act decisively—not only by bolstering military capacity but by integrating systems, strategies, and policies to address the multifaceted threats they face. Hybrid threats, which blur the lines between military and non-military aggression, pose an escalating risk. Europe must develop coordinated, proactive responses that cover everything from safeguarding its digital and energy infrastructures to countering disinformation campaigns. Despite the continent’s robust interconnectivity, the absence of a unified strategy to protect these assets leaves Europe vulnerable. The time has come for a comprehensive European approach to defense—one that ensures rapid, coordinated action against the emerging grey zone threats of the 21st century.
Breaking the Narrative of European Weakness
Urgent action is necessary, but the persistent narrative that Europe is incapable of defending itself without American support not only undermines its security potential but also distorts some of the reality. In truth, the EU’s defense expenditure increased by 30% between 2021 and 2024, with further significant increases planned in the coming years [1]. Despite pro-Russian commentators pushing the idea of Western weakness and an inevitable Russian victory, the facts tell a different story. Europe is not defenseless—it is adapting. The notion that the West is on the verge of collapse ignores both the fundamental weaknesses of the Russian military and the growing strength of European defenses.
Meanwhile, Europe remains highly critical of its own shortcomings, often overlooking its sheer strength: a population five times larger and an economy ten times the size of Russia’s. Europe is not lacking in power—it is lacking in coordination. However, with newfound unity in supporting Ukraine, a shared perception of the Russian threat, and the shifting reality of American disengagement, Europe now has a crucial window of opportunity. The political will to strengthen Europe’s military—a hurdle that has long constrained its potential—is now firmly in place, opening the door for real and decisive action.
In response to recent geopolitical shifts, EU member states (excluding Hungary) have committed to a historic €800 billion in combined military spending [2]. This massive commitment marks a transformation of Europe into a hard military power. Additionally, Europe is home to world-class defense companies that produce highly advanced military equipment—companies that have often been overlooked in favor of American-made weapons. With reduced dependency on U.S. security, European nations may now feel less pressure to purchase American arms, opting instead to support their own defense industry. This shift is already reflected in rising stock values for European defense firms, a clear indicator that investors anticipate a more self-sufficient and robust European military sector.
Europe is stepping up, both financially and strategically. But the critical question remains: How should this increased military spending be allocated to ensure the most effective and sustainable defense strategy?
Modern warfare - The Multifaceted Nature of Hybrid Threats
The war in Ukraine has starkly highlighted Europe’s vulnerability across a range of domains—from internet and energy infrastructures to the spread of disinformation aimed at disrupting democratic processes. Russia’s persistent use of hybrid tactics has forced European leaders to rethink their defense postures. As detailed in recent analyses, including a Politico report on Russia’s hybrid strategies, the challenge is clear: Europe must develop integrated, proactive responses to counter threats that blur the traditional lines between military and non-military aggression.
Hybrid threats today extend far beyond conventional battlefield engagements. They include sophisticated cyberattacks, coordinated disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and even the physical sabotage of critical infrastructure—such as the undersea cables that carry over 99% of global data traffic [3]. These cables form the backbone of modern communications, financial systems, and national security. Yet protecting them is immensely complex, hindered by overlapping international jurisdictions and fragmented legal regimes that govern both private enterprise and state security.
At a security conference in Riga, Landsbergis provocatively remarked, “Why do we call it hybrid? Because when you label it as such, it conveniently absolves you of the need to act. In contrast, calling it terrorism demands a robust response” [4]. This observation encapsulates a key element of Russia’s strategy: by engaging in low-level acts of sabotage—targeting, for example, submarine internet cables and power grids—Russia is effectively testing how much disruption it can cause before triggering a full-scale response. Labeling these actions as “hybrid” risks downplaying their impact and the urgent need for a dedicated counterstrategy.
In response, Europe is compelled to rethink its security strategy—not only by scaling up military spending but also by integrating defenses across cyber, information, economic, and physical domains. The goal is clear: develop a coordinated, resilient strategy that leaves no gap for hybrid adversaries to exploit.
Fishery disputes – lessons on how to react to hybrid threats.
There have been instances where responses to Russian hybrid threats did not lead to escalation. Maritime security challenges—especially in the realm of interstate fishery disputes—have in many instances been securitized by various countries, such as Iceland, Canada etc. Russia has challenged Norwegian territorial claims by sending private fishing vessels to fish in Norwegian sea territories, in The Barents Sea. A subtle method Russia applies to undermine other countries sovereignty. However, in 2005, the Norwegian Coast Guard intercepted a Russian trawler named Elektron, which was fishing illegally in the Fisheries Protection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago. The coast guard boarded the vessel, issued an arrest order, and demanded that the crew accompany them to mainland Norway for detention. Although the trawler managed to escape back into Russian territorial waters, the incident had the potential to escalate rapidly.
Observers in Russia were outraged by the attempted arrest, arguing that Norway had no legitimate claim over the northern territories. They called for the Russian navy to flex its muscles in the Barents Sea as a show of force—a subtle maneuver to disregard Norwegian territorial claims in the region. Ultimately, however, escalation was avoided, and the company for which Elektron was fishing was subsequently dismantled.
Experts point to several factors that likely contributed to Russia’s decision not to escalate the situation:
- The area was designated as a Protection Zone under a resource management policy, meaning the arrest was conducted by the fishery coast guard which is a separate force from the navy, and the protection zone set clear reasoning for management, which made it hard for Russia to justify military escalation.
- Advances in surveillance technology allowed the coast guard to confidently verify the illegal activity.
- Long-term strategic communication had reinforced Norway’s sovereign claims over these areas.
The key takeaway from this case is the importance of having a clear policy framework to respond to hybrid threats. Establishing well-defined boundaries and a proportional response system, leveraging technology to gather indisputable evidence of interference, and communicating claims, consequences, and red lines transparently, can all help manage hybrid threats without triggering further escalations.
Submarine cables – Our greatest vulnerability
Submarine cables are a cornerstone of Europe’s digital infrastructure, carrying nearly 99% of intercontinental internet traffic—and as such, they are high-value military targets. Unlike Europe, Russia relies mainly on land-based infrastructure for its connectivity to Europe and Central Asia. This gives Russia a strategic advantage: because it isn’t dependent on these vulnerable undersea links, it can target them to disrupt European services without risking its own connectivity.
Recent incidents of disruption in this infrastructure underscores this threat. A telecommunication cable between Estonia and Sweden was found to be deliberately cut, and a similar disruption occurred on a cable linking Norway and Svalbard, where one of the only two submarine cables connecting the archipelago was cut. Although these cases share some parallels with territorial disputes in the fishery sector, protecting submarine cables involves far greater legal and operational complexities. In the vast expanse of the ocean, detecting a single act of sabotage is significantly more challenging than identifying breaches of fishing regulations.
In many strategic areas, multiple cables connect major cities, enabling data to be rerouted if one cable is compromised. However, this redundancy only offers temporary relief. A coordinated attack that takes out several cables simultaneously—especially in regions like the Svalbard archipelago, which depends on just two cables—could have catastrophic consequences. With the cost to repair a single cable reaching up to $100 million, it is imperative for Europe to develop a cohesive, Europe-wide strategy to safeguard its undersea cable network. As defense spending increases, Europe can no longer afford to depend on American leadership for protection in this critical area. Increasing cable repair capacity and deploying more cable boats may help, but they are not sufficient solutions on their own.
Lessons from fishery disputes underscore the need for a streamlined policy framework governing submarine cables. These cables cross national territorial waters and international waters and are typically owned by private companies, complicating accountability when sabotage occurs—especially in international waters where no clear legal framework exists. Moreover, Russia exploits these gaps by using civilian vessels, such as fishing trawlers, which can cause damage by dragging heavy nets or anchors along the seabed. Such vessels, seemingly innocuous as they pass by, provide Russia with plausible deniability. Adding to the complexity is the Russian navy’s use of a civilian body—the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research—which conducts “civilian” missions. Although its personnel are largely drawn from the navy, these research boats do not operate as an independent fleet. Instead, they are frequently observed around European submarine infrastructure, posing a significant threat due to the legal limbo in which they operate. The Estonian government has decided to apply to the International Maritime Organization by February to update the maritime law [5]. The signals from Estonia reflects an initiative to streamline policies and work together with international frameworks to better regulate subsea infrastructure.
A second lesson drawn from fishery disputes is the critical need for robust surveillance technology to protect submarine cables. Enhanced monitoring systems are essential not only for reacting to acts of sabotage but also for providing concrete evidence of wrongdoing. Although European nations have increased patrols in vulnerable regions, precise monitoring requires significant computing power. For instance, the Baltic Sea is emerging as a testing ground for an innovative alert system. This system links sensors—mounted on wind turbines—to continuously monitor the seabed for anomalies and promptly alert operators to potential threats [6]. Such an alter system would significantly support coast guards operating in the Baltic Sea to react on specific vessels causing damage to a cable in the area, and such a system could also be applied in other sea territories such as the North Sea.
A final, crucial lesson is the need for clear communication and a decisive approach. Europe must establish firm red lines that leave no doubt about the consequences of sabotage. This ensures that any hybrid attack on submarine infrastructure is met with a proportional and coordinated response, deterring further aggression while preventing uncontrolled escalation. The EU Action Plan on Cable Security, published on February 21, 2025, marks an important step in this direction. It lays out a structured approach to enhancing the resilience and security of submarine cables, covering both communication and electricity infrastructure. This initiative could be a way forward with the EU as a unifying voice on this issue.
Despite these efforts, Europe’s submarine cable network remains highly vulnerable. Beyond strengthening repair capacities and deploying additional cable maintenance vessels, alternative contingency plans must be explored. One key solution is the development of an independent satellite network to reroute data in the event of large-scale disruptions. While commercial ventures like Elon Musk’s Starlink and Amazon’s Kuiper are expanding global internet coverage, Europe cannot afford to rely on American-controlled systems. Instead, forming strategic partnerships with projects such as Britain’s OneWeb could help establish a more self-sufficient and resilient European infrastructure. However, such an initiative would come with significant financial costs and the added challenge of replacing American surveillance and intelligence services. This highlights the difficult choices Europe must make in prioritizing resources to ensure its long-term security and strategic independence.
Conclusion
The events since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have served as a series of powerful wake-up calls for Europe. European leaders and citizens now recognize that the time has come to secure their own defense—without relying on the US, even for critical surveillance capabilities. A substantial portion of the newly increased defense budget will need to be directed toward countering hybrid threats and addressing the complex challenges they present, while simultaneously investing in homegrown alternatives to American services. Although rearmament presents its own set of challenges amid economic and political uncertainties, there is a newfound unity among European leaders on the necessity of developing comprehensive, independent security capacities. This broad public support for an integrated European defense strategy is perhaps the most significant step forward, as it not only reinforces the resolve to overcome existing vulnerabilities but also paves the way for a future where Europe confidently leads its own security efforts. Ultimately, this new era of defense integration and increased military spending underscores that Europe is no longer a passive recipient of external support, but a proactive and capable actor ready to safeguard its future.
Sources
Bueger, C., Liebetrau, T., & Franken, J. (2022). Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure–consequences for the EU. Report for SEDE Committee of the European Parliament, PE702, 557, 11-56.
Bruusgaard, K. V. (2006). Fiskerikonflikter i Barentshavet-potensial for eskalering-en komparativ studie av russiske reaksjonsmønstre under oppbringelsen av" Tsjernigov"(2001) og" Elektron"(2005).
Lonardo, L. (2021). EU law against hybrid threats: A first assessment. European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021(2), 1075-1096.
[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/#:~:text=Boosting%20competitiveness-,How%20much%20are%20EU%20member%20states%20spending%20on%20defence%3F,about%201.9%25%20of%20EU%20GDP.
[2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/statement_25_673
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/22/wire-cutters-how-the-worlds-vital-undersea-data-cables-are-being-targeted
[4] https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-hybrid-war-vladimir-putin-germany-cyberattacks-election-interference/
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/maritime-law-has-be-changed-protect-undersea-infrastructure-estonia-says-2024-12-27/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[6] https://balticwind.eu/nato-determined-to-protect-critical-undersea-energy-infrastructure/
